



### 







### Application Environment Security Requirements II Government(Classified) Protect information affecting national security Protect intelligence information Insure integrity of weapons systemsCorporate Networks Protect corporate confidentiality Insure authenticity of messages Electronic trading Authenticate source of transactions Insure integrity of transactions Insure confidentiality of critical corporate information Provide legally binding contracts

### 

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### Apply to specific security domains and are established by authorities for those domains. Security policy refinement Security policy objectives organization's statement of intent regarding protection of specific resources. This may be quite general. For example, Government protects information that affects the national security Organizational security policy specific rules and regulations that describe how the security policy objectives will be achieved. An organizational security policy is often in terms of people and information. Philosophical Question: In the Information Age, do we envision policies that would not involve people? System security policy If we understand systems to be an extension of the people associated with the organization, then systems are operated on behalf of those people. Here the policy is a technical statement describing how a system is engineered to support the organizational security policy.



### Threat \* Danger to confidentiality, integrity or availability Passive \* monitoring traffic \* obtaining the contents of a message \* traffic analysis Active \* introducing a Trojan Horse to deliberately violate policy \* modification of information \* fabrication of false information \* denial of service attacks Malicious/Accidental \* Spamming \* Sending e-mail to the wrong person

### Threats correspond to security objectives Information leakage Integrity violation Denial of Service (some include illegitimate use)Primary Enabling Threats Masquerade Bypass of controls Authorization violation Planting Threats Trojan Horse Trapdoor Underlying Threats eavesdropping traffic analysis loquacious, indiscreet individuals media scavenging

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### **Trends Affecting Attacks**

- Increasing Ease of Engineering an Attack
- Famous attacks
  - \* Stoll's "wiley hacker"
  - \* Morris Internet worm
  - **★** Government homepage graffiti
  - ★ Takedown of Midnick (release of Midnick?)
  - \* How-to guides for attackers

### **Security Services: Authentication**

- Provides assurances of the identity of a person or system
  - \* photo id card driver's license
  - \* mother's maiden name at the bank
  - \* entity authentication
    - · Authentication of a remote party in a communications exchange · Who's there?

  - · Needed to support access control
  - Can be used to provide data integrity authentication
  - · Supports accountability
  - · Identities in the audit trail
  - \* data origin authentication
    - Originator of data item is given along with data
    - · Who is sending this?
    - · helps to insure the integrity of a data item

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### **Access Control Service**

- provides protection against unauthorized use or manipulation of resources
  - \* locks and keysguards
  - \* who can use, modify, read, destroy, and issue commands
  - \* supports confidentiality, integrity, availability
    - · who can issue management commands
    - · who can tie up resources
    - · who can obtain information to be used for denial of service

### **Reference Monitor Concept Critical**

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### **Reference Monitor Concept**

- Mediates access
- Defines security perimeter
- POLICY INDEPENDENT
  - \* applicable to a variety of policies
- \* applicable to many implementations of policy ■ General Schema:
- - · passive entities containing information
- \* Subjects active entities. \* Authorization Database
- ★ Two Types of functions
  - Authorization functions change authorization database Reference functions access information
  - observe and/or modify
- Requirements

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### Non-repudiation Service

- Provides protection to one or both parties in an information exchange against subsequent denial of that exchange by the other party
  - ★ notary's signature
  - \* process servers, certified mail, receipts of mail delivery
  - \* Repudiation of origin
    - · disputes over whether a particular entity originated a given data
  - \* Repudiation of delivery
    - · dispute over whether a particular data item was delivered to a particular party

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### Security Services Data Integrity Service

- Provides protection against unauthorized the modification, deletion or substitution of information
  - \* indelible ink
  - ★ credit card/driver's licence holography
  - \* wish to prevent: modification, replay, creation, deletion of data items - What are some banking examples?
  - \* Granularity:
    - · connection integrity service
    - · connectionless integrity service
    - · selected field integrity service

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## Security Services: Confidentiality Service Provides protection against unauthorized disclosure of information to entities \* opaque envelopes, seals \* invisible ink \* note the difference between data and information \* data item in storage existence or non-existence of data item size of data item \* dynamic characteristics of the system \* Data Confidentiality Service - sensitive information cannot be revealed by inspecting the size of content of a data item (encryptor) \* Granularity - connection confidentiality service - all data transmitted on a connection - connectionless confidentiality service - all data in one connectionless data unit-selective field confidentiality service - applies to specific fields in the data unit \* Traffic Flow Confidentiality Summer Quarter, 2000 C. Irvine: NPS CISR 19

### Example Threats ■ Informal RequirementsThreats ■ Everyone: keep out hackers ■ Masquerade ★ Banking · Insure integrity of transactions ★ Authenticate sources of transactions (e.g. retail transactions customers) ★ Insure secrecy of PINs ★ Provide customer confidentiality ■ Integrity violations ■ Masquerade, repudiation

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| Covernment (SBU)
| Protect Privacy Act Information
| Insure information confidentiality for SBU
| Provide electronic signatures for contractual documents
| Masquerade, authorization violation, eavesdropping, integrity violation
| Repudiation
| Covernment (Classified)
| Protect information affecting national security
| Protect intelligence information
| Insure integrity of weapons systems
| Masquerade, authorization violation, eavesdropping, integrity violationCorporateProtect corporate confidentialitylinsure authenticity of messages
| Eavesdropping
| Masquerade, integrity violation
| Electronic Trading
| Authenticale source of transactions
| Insure integrity of transactions
| Insure confidentiality of critical corporate information
| Provide legally binding contracts
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Eavesdropping

Repudiation
TelecommunicationsProtect user's privacy
Insure continuity of service
Isolate administrative privileges

Eavesdropping

Denial of Service
Masquerade, authorization violation

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### **Threat Model**

- Method of Attack
  - \* Subvert Systems During Development
  - \* Subvert Systems During Upgrades
  - \* Subvert Systems via Data Driven Attacks
    - · Usually using the victim as an unwitting accomplice
- With Hooks in Systems
  - \* Attack at will Any Time, Any Place

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### When is Security Good Enough?

- Perfect Security Cannot be Achieved
  - \* Wouldn't want it anyway cannot get work done
- Need security sufficient for accepted threat model
- Absence of obvious insecurity does not imply a secure system
  - Dijkstra stated that there was no way other than good engineering to build sound software. Testing can demonstrate the presence or absence of a particular bug but cannot show the absence of bugs in appear.
- Risk Analysis
  - ★ Permits application of Security mechanisms in a systematic manner
  - \* Provides a methodolgy for defining Adequate Security

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### **Attack Thresholds**

- Attacks are esoteric only for a short time
  - ★ tool kits become available with tested attack tools
  - \* inexperienced attackers can use them
- Technical Attacks are not Expensive
  - ★ hardware is relatively inexpensive
  - ★ software is effectively free
- No attack should be dismissed because it seems "too technical" for attackers

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### Attacks on the Wire

- Passive
  - ★ listen without modification of messages
    - · do not affect network operations
  - \* Usually cannot detect
  - \* Preventable
- Active
  - $\star$  Modification of messages
  - ★ Disruptive activity
  - ⋆ Detectable
  - **★ Not preventable**

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
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### **Attacks**

- Observation of Information
  - \* impact on confidentiality
  - \* engage in traffic analysis
- Modify Message
- \* change contents in manner undetectable by recipient
- Masquerade
  - \* pretend to be someone else
- Message Stream Manipulation
  - ★ change sequence of messages★ cause delays in message recipt
  - ★ Cause delays ITT
     ★ Denial of Service
  - overload hosts or network, thus disrupting ability to communicate
- Replay
- \* reuse messages at a later time for disruptive purposes

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### Security Services Confidentiality Authenticity Data Integrity Access Control Non-Repudiation Availability

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### Services for Data Confidentiality Data is not revealed or available to unauthorized individuals, entities or processes Foremost objective: protection against unauthorized disclosure connection-oriented confidentiality selective field confidentiality selective field confidentiality selective field confidentiality patterns of message origin and destination message size message transmission frequency Mechanisms Cryptography

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Services for Authenticity

who is the source of this data?
Needed as input for access control and audit
Tied to data integrity services


Peer entity authentication

timeliness vs. replay
peer in the association is the one claimed
applicable to connection-oriented communication

Granularity Considerations

Mechanisms:
Key distribution
protocols
user identity validation

**Data Integrity Services** ■ Insure against unauthorized data modification or destruction Connectless Integrity \* per message \* protect message contents from undetected modification \* associated with data origin authentication ■ Connection-oriented integrity \* often provided by transport layer protocols \* ensure that all of the data is at destination · reassembly Mechanisms \* detection codes \* time stamps \* sequence numbers \* cryptography Summer Quarter, 2000 C. Irvine; NPS CISR



Non-Repudiation Services

Prevent one party in a communication from denial of having participated
Origin non-repudiation
Prevent false denial of having sent message
includes time
Receipt non-repudiation
Prevent false denial of having received a message
includes time (what about network latency?)

Mechanisms
Digital Signatures
Time stamps
Time stamps
Trusted software
Notarization

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# Availability Services Not a standard service \* Recent DOS attacks indicate that it is needed Subjective \* One person's sufficient availability may be DOS for another Similar to wiretapping \* Know when it is happening \* Cannot prevent it Mechanisms \* replication and fault tolerance \* reliability mechanisms \* robust algorithms • (see Oakley later on in course)